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A PROPOSAL: LEGAL RE-REGUILATION OF
THE CONTENT OF MARRIAGE
KATHERINE SHAW SPAHT*
INTRODUCTION
With growing concern expressed about the vitality of the
institution of marriage and simultaneously, the increasingly
impatient demands for access to marriage, it is forgivable for a
person to have missed the fact that these ultimately inconsistent
strains of argument from two different sides of the cultural divide
do make the same fundamental assumption-that marriage is
important as a public matter. The deep concern about marriage
expressed in different ways-by social science researchers, as evi-
dence mounts about the toll that broken families inflict;' by the
formation and growth of a National Marriage Movement; and by
the appearance of marriage as a centerpiece in state and federal
"governmental" policy-draws together citizens who are commit-
ted to revitalizing the institution of marriage. These supporters
of marriage begin by reminding us that we all have an enormous
stake in the maintenance of a vigorous and healthy "marriage
culture." And, if we have a stake in a marriage culture, then we
are talking about the "public's interest" or the common good.
Marriage is not, nor has it ever been, about a purely "private"
relationship; this relationship has very public consequences.
In fact it is those public consequences that motivate those on
the opposite side of the cultural divide to press for unrestricted
access to "marriage;" they interpret marriage as a bundle of "legal"
rights. Rarely among these advocates of same-sex marriage do
you hear about the imposition of obligations, the corollary to
rights. Furthermore, at least some of the advocates are honest
enough to admit that they intend to transform marriage-re-
* Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Professor of Law, Louisiana State Uni-
versity Law Center. The author is a member of the newly organized Society of
Louisiana Civil Law Scholars.
1. Editorial, The Marriage Amendment, FIRsT THINGS, Oct. 2003, at 16.
After decades of experiments with single-parent families, "open mar-
riages," and easy divorce, the evidence is in and there is today near-
unanimous agreement on what should always have been obvious:
judged by every index of well-being, there is no more important factor
in the lives of children than having a mother and father in the home.
Id.
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imagine marriage. That re-imagining of marriage consists of
questioning not simply the historical and universal requirement
of sexual complementarity, but also the shared common under-
standings of the marital obligation of fidelity, of the manner in
which married persons organize their property relationships, and
of the other restrictions regulating entry into marriage. After all,
once sexual complementarity, the most fundamental of assump-
tions about marriage, is purged from the legal institution it
becomes difficult to argue justification for any other traditional
moral view of marriage.
If traditional marriage advocates who are deeply anguished
about this fundamental institution desire to reinvigorate and
strengthen marriage and convey the substantial public interest in
marriage, they should propose restoring legal regulation of the
content of marriage. A result of the re-regulation of marriage's
content through law might be to arrest the clamor for universal
access since increasing legal regulation makes marriage far less
desirable. A second result might be that the adoption of new
laws suggests that the public rejects re-imagining marriage.
This essay first recounts briefly the historical retreat of law
from regulation of the content of marriage,2 regulation often
accomplished indirectly through statutory grounds for separa-
tion or divorce. This essay also offers alternatives from compara-
tive law for the re-regulation of marriage and considers the threat
posed by Lawrence v. Texas,3 the United States Supreme Court
decision invalidating the Texas sodomy statute, to any state statu-
tory re-regulation of marriage. Lastly, this essay offers a legal
mechanism for avoiding the threat of Lawrence, whether real or
imagined. In the same way that the proposed marriage amend-
ment to the United States Constitution 4 attempts to take "pre-
emptive" action to prevent the Supreme Court from redefining
marriage, the proposals in this essay assume a similar offensive
tactic. If the decision in the Lawrence case is as radical as it reads,
2. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible
Retreat of Law from the Regulation of Marriage, 63 LA. L. REv. 243 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years], for a much longer and more detailed
exposition of the deconstruction of legal barriers and constraints that protected
the relationship from both a spouse and third persons.
3. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
4. See The Marriage Amendment, supra note 1, at 14.
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man
and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any
state, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to require that mari-
tal status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred on unmarried
couples or groups.
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the American people need to understand the seriousness of the
threat and decide whether and how to respond.
I. BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE DEREGULATION
OF MARRIAGE
In an earlier article, I described the retreat of law from the
regulation of marriage over the last century.5 I chose the date
arbitrarily with the knowledge that the retreat began long before
that date. I selected the state of Louisiana simply as an example
of what has happened in the United States. I did so because of
my familiarity with the law and its historical evolution and
because of the possibility that other civil law jurisdictions in
North and South America, as well as in Europe, might offer use-
ful examples of how to re-regulate marriage. My search was
restricted to civil law jurisdictions for two reasons: (1) familiar
construction and codification of the private law of the family (in
other words, a statutory formulation that declares relatively
broad principles) and (2) the widely recognized and lengthy his-
torical use of law to do more than simply constrain-for exam-
ple, to teach.6 An example, which is my personal favorite
currently appearing in the Louisiana Civil Code, is the content of
Civil Code article 215: "A child, whatever be his age, owes honor
and respect to his father and mother."7 Obviously, the statute
describes the behavior of a "good" child, one who is obliged to
honor and respect his parents until their death. Its breach has
few legal consequences. After minority, the only consequence of
the child's failure to honor and respect his parents is, if the child
is a forced heir,' grounds for disinherison which consist of serious
acts of dishonor and disrespect.9 The fact that this law does not
5. See Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years, supra note 2.
6. Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 495, 496 (1992).
7. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 215 (West 2003) (emphasis added).
8. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1493(A) (West 2003) (defining forced heirs as
descendants of the first degree who are under twenty-four years of age or per-
manently incapable of caring for their persons or administering their estates).
Forced heirship is a civil law concept that reserves a portion of a parent's estate
for descendants. UntilJanuary 1, 1996, forced heirship applied to all descend-
ants regardless of age; after that date forced heirship was limited to the two
described categories of descendants, with some limited exceptions for
grandchildren. Id. (as amended by 1995 La. Acts 1180, 1996 La. Acts. 77 (1st
Exec. Sess.)).
9. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1621 (West Supp. 2003) (including eight
acts by the child, such as cruel treatment, raising of his hand to strike the par-
ent, attempting to kill the parent, and violence to keep a parent from making a
will).
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prohibit, punish, or constrain does not mean that it lacks value.
It states a biblical command, and I have found it useful on more
than one occasion with my own children.
Historically, the law of Louisiana, as was true of the law of
other states as well as other countries in the West, highly regu-
lated entry into marriage. The legal consequences of a breach of
the promise to marry, which Louisiana still recognizes, the
affirmative defenses to such an action, and the aggravation of
damages if there was seduction, communicated in a most direct
fashion the public's view about the seriousness of the decision to
marry. The public considered the decision to marry, evidenced
by an exchange of promises, as serious, which is why the law pro-
vided a remedy for its breach. Furthermore, affirmative defenses
to the action for breach of promise, such as lack of chastity of the
claimant and the rule that seduction aggravated the damages
recoverable by a claimant also communicated society's view of
sexual relations before marriage."0 There were a myriad of regu-
lations prescribing prerequisites to marriage that required time
to complete and provided information about the other party that
could prove decisive, such as a medical certificate attesting to a
fiance's freedom from venereal disease. Most of the laws regulat-
ing entry into marriage have been repealed or judicially declared
to be merely directory.
Those who were legally prohibited from marrying reflected
an even more fundamental interest of the public; the marriage of
a person already married to another or that of close blood rela-
tives violated public order and good morals.11 What may be a sur-
prise is that the marriage of a woman within ten months of the
dissolution of her marriage to another12 or the marriage of an
adulterer to his accomplice was also absolutely null in Louisiana
until the 1970s. 3 These marriages were considered as violative
of the public interest as bigamous or incestuous marriages,
although for different reasons. The marriage of a woman within
ten months of dissolution of her prior marriage could create the
potential issue of two legal fathers, one the husband of the
10. Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years, supra note 2, at 247-50, 268-75.
11. Id. at 250-61. The proscriptions against bigamous marriages and
incestuous marriages still survive in Louisiana. See LA. Clv. CODE ANN. arts. 88,
90 (West 2003).
12. LA. Civ. CODE art. 137 (1870) (repealed 1970) (compiled in 16 LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. (West 1973)) ("The wife shall not be at liberty to contract
another marriage, until ten months after the dissolution of her preceding
marriage.").
13. LA. Ctv. CODE art. 161 (1870) (repealed 1972) (compiled in 16 LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. (West 1973)). See Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years, supra note
2, at 256-61.
A PROPOSAL: LEGAL RE-REGULATION
mother at the time of the child's conception and the other, the
husband of the mother at the time of birth. That dilemma could
ultimately adversely affect the child and his legal rights. The
"rights" and desires of adults simply had to yield to the potential
interest of a child who would suffer as a result of the adult's
desire to remarry. As to prohibiting the marriage of an adulterer
to his accomplice, the obvious purpose was to protect the mar-
riage relationship from third persons; the denial of a subsequent
right to marry removed one incentive for seduction since an
affair with a married person precluded his remarriage to his co-
respondent. Other provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code rein-
forced the barrier around the marital relationship; the law
denied to the children of such adulterous (and incestuous)
unions rights afforded to other illegitimate children not con-
ceived or born under such circumstances.14 Moreover, if the
innocent spouse obtained a divorce on grounds of adultery, that
spouse was awarded custody of any minor children of the mar-
riage."m Indeed, there were other punitive legal consequences
imposed upon a spouse who engaged in egregious behavior.
Other states chose different mechanisms as barriers around the
marriage relationship, such as the alienation of affection action;
but all had legal barriers to protect marriage from external
threats.
Marriage was also protected from internal threats by creat-
ing legal obstacles to its dissolution and prescribing what consti-
tuted the conduct expected of a "good" spouse. Fault grounds
for separation and divorce were especially articulate in describ-
ing the public's expectation as to how spouses should act toward
each other: (1) faithfully, by not sharing his or her sexual poten-
tial with another person (adultery); (2) not criminally, in the
form of a felony punishable by physical separation (conviction of
a felony and sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor);
(3) not cruelly, either physically or mentally, and not intemper-
ately; (4) willingly living together (abandonment without lawful
14. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE art. 245 (1870) (repealed 1979) (compiled in
16 LA. CiV. CODE ANN. (West 1973)) (requiring support of such children only
by mothers, not fathers); LA. CIxv. CODE art. 920 (1870) (compiled in 16 LA. Clv.
CODE ANN. (West 1973)) (revised, amended, and reenacted by 1982 La. Acts
919 § 1) ("Bastard, adulterous or incestuous children shall not enjoy the right
of inheriting the estates of their natural father or mother . . ").
15. LA. Crv. CODE art. 161 (1870) (repealed 1972) (compiled in 16 LA.
Crv. CODE ANN. (West 1973)) ("In case of divorce, on account of adultery, the
guilty party can never hereafter contract matrimony with his or her accomplice
in adultery, under the penalty of being considered and prosecuted as guilty of
the crime of bigamy, and under the penalty of nullity of the new marriage
20041
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cause and a constant refusal to return); (5) not publicly defam-
ing each other (public defamation); (6) not attempting to kill
each other (an attempt on the life of the other spouse); and (7)
adequately supporting the other spouse (intentional non-support
of a spouse in destitute or necessitous circumstances).16 Each
spouse owed the obligations of fidelity, support, and assistance; 17
thus, the grounds for separation and divorce were the remedies
provided for breach of those obligations. Although it was not a
constituent part of the law regulating rights and duties of mar-
ried persons, the law of separation and divorce spoke elo-
quently: 8 "Certain conduct was so egregious and such a serious
violation of one's marital obligations that the law permitted the
aggrieved spouse to seek a separation from bed and board, which
did not have the effect of terminating the marriage, or, if the
conduct was especially egregious, a divorce." 9
The assumption historically in the law of marriage-entry
into marriage, who can marry, content of marriage, and grounds
for dissolution-was that marriage was a public, albeit natural,
institution. How one entered marriage and with whom, as well as
the conduct of spouses during the marriage, were matters of
utmost concern to the community in which the married couple
lived, including most importantly their own children. Spouses
"were to behave toward each other civilly and compassionately so
that the marriage might serve the public interests of channeling
the two adults' sexual passions into marriage and of assuring that
the acculturation of any children born of the union be done in a
cooperative and caring manner."2 ° Furthermore, "[e] ach spouse
was to yield to the other in sexual matters as long as the request
was reasonable and to conduct himself so as not to bring dis-
honor and shame to the family formed by the marriage, which
could occur by adulterous affairs, outrageous or felonious behav-
ior, and constant intemperance. '"21 The rest of society "had
expectations about a married person's conduct and if those
expectations were not met, although deeply interested in pre-
serving the stability of marriages, society was willing to yield to
the individual desires of the aggrieved spouse. 22
16. LA. CIv. CODE art. 138 (1870) (repealed 1990) (compiled in 16 LA.
Crv. CODE ANN. (West 1973 & Supp. 2003)).
17. LA. CiV. CODE art. 119 (1870) (repealed 1997) (compiled in 16 LA.
Civ. CODE ANN. (West 1973)).
18. Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years, supra note 2, at 294.
19. Id. at 293.
20. Id. at 294.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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By examining the evolution of marriage law over the last
century, it is easier "to see the withdrawal of the expression of
public interest in marriage through changes in the laws of
divorce ... and of the legal content of marriage[:] [o]ver the last
century, the law found significantly less to prohibit, less to pro-
tect, and less to regulate. ' 23 To evolve from "an institution that
could not be terminated by the spouses to a 'relationship' that
can be ended by the decision of one spouse alone for no good or
sufficient reason is a radical revolution."24 As the law has with-
drawn from regulating marriage, it is not unreasonable for our
citizens to believe that marriage is a private relationship, the con-
tent of which can be created by the parties, for the parties, and
for their individual fulfillment and satisfaction. Marriage in
effect has been "privatized."
Even by its absence, law can shape culture in destructive ways.
25
II. RECONSTRUCTION BY RE-REGULATION OF MARRIAGE:
WHAT MIGHT IT LooK LIKE?
Culture does not exist in a legal vacuum .... For law is neces-
saiy to civilization. Even the absence of law-the choice to omit or
remove legal regulation in some area of cultural life-shapes cul-
ture, for better orfor worse .... Alone, it cannot cure moral defects
in a people. It can, however, change people's sense of their hierar-
chy of values and of what finally falls out of the realm of accept-
able behavior. Law teaches more than it prevents.
26
By concentrating upon re-regulating the content of the mar-
riage relationship, I do not intend to ignore the need for greater
legal regulation of entry into marriage (with mandatory or per-
missive pre-marital counseling), or of dissolution of marriage
through various divorce reform efforts. However, one area of
legal re-regulation often overlooked is the content of the mar-
riage relationship itself, personal rights and obligations. The
content of marriage, how spouses are to act toward each other,
has suffered from the trend toward private ordering in marriage.
The retreat of law from regulation of the content of marriage
means that the spouses are now free to "regulate" themselves,
with few exceptions, as they see fit. Yet, any sort of custom
related to the content of marriage, such as monogamy or perma-
23. Id. at 301.
24. Id.
25. Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture, Dedication Address at Ave
Maria School of Law (Mar. 21, 2002), in 1 AvE MARIA L. Rv. 1, 13 (2003).
26. Id. at 16-17.
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nence, necessarily requires "a culture" that supports it; "monog-
amy ... cannot be practiced by an individual. 2 v
A civil law jurisdiction may have a natural advantage over a
traditional common law jurisdiction in re-regulating the content
of marriage. The natural advantage results from the fact that the
law of the family, including that of husband and wife, is the sub-
ject of codification in a civil law jurisdiction. In other words, a
civil law jurisdiction is not dependent upon judicial decisions to
formulate and reassert legal regulation of the content of mar-
riage. Nor is a civil lawjurisdiction confined to the ordinary type
of statutory regulation in a common law jurisdiction-narrowly
tailored legislation to solve a particular problem. In a civil law
jurisdiction, a statute drafter may craft a law stating general prin-
ciples about the content of marriage, some with legal conse-
quences intended to constrain or punish and others intended to
be simply hortatory. To that extent the statute drafter in a civil
law jurisdiction enjoys a luxury that the drafter in the ordinary
common law jurisdiction does not.
Currently under the law of Louisiana, whose private law is
derived from civil law jurisdictions (France and Spain), there are
three statutory obligations imposed upon a wife and a husband.2 8
These obligations are personal not patrimonial.2 9 Louisiana Civil
Code article 98 simply states:
Married persons owe each other fidelity, support, and
assistance.
30
The official comments explain the meaning of each of the
three words. Fidelity "refers not only to the spouses' duty to
refrain from adultery [negative aspect of fidelity], but also to
their mutual obligation to submit to each other's reasonable and
27. Id. at 13, quotingJOSEPH RAz, THE MoRALrrv OF FREEDOM 162 (1986).
28. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 98 (West 2003). The author is the Reporter
of the Marriage/Persons Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute; Arti-
cle 98 and the revision of the law of marriage was proposed by her committee
and ultimately the Council of the Law Institute. However, the author had sug-
gested a far more comprehensive regulation of marriage which more closely
resembles the articles that follow in this section. The Committee rejected the
recommendations, preferring to permit the spouses to privately arrange their
own personal, day-to-day relationship. See Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years,
supra note 2, at 296.
29. An entirely different Book and Title of the Civil Code of Louisiana
governs the patrimonial (property) rights and obligations of spouses-Book III,
Title VI, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2325-2437 (West 2003). Book I, Title IV
contains the law of husband and wife (personal obligations). See LA. Civ. CODE
ANN. art. 98, cmt. g (West 2003); see also KATHERINE SHAW SPAHT, FAMILY LAw IN
LouisLAA 117-40 (3d ed. 2003).
30. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 98 (West 2003).
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normal sexual desires [positive aspect of fidelity]. The jurispru-
dence has held that the latter obligation is a necessary concomi-
tant of marriage." 1 Support, under earlier jurisprudence is
"limited to furnishing the necessities of life.... Nevertheless, the
term 'support' has been construed to include the cost not only of
food, clothing and shelter, but also of operating such conve-
niences as telephones, home appliances, and an automobile. 32
Assistance "includes the personal care to be given an ill or infirm
spouse '33 or more broadly construed, cooperation in the accom-
plishment of all tasks necessary for the spouses' life in common.
Although there is no longer an explicit obligation imposed upon
the spouses to live together, the obligations of fidelity (positive),
support, and assistance require that the spouses do live together
for significant periods of time. 4 The consequences of a breach
of the three obligations by a spouse are to afford the other
aggrieved spouse grounds for divorce, in the case of a breach of
the negative obligation of fidelity,35 and, in other cases, denial of
support because of fault on the part of the claimant spouse. 6
For an economically secure spouse, the only breach of any of the
three obligations with consequences is the breach of the obliga-
tion of fidelity.
37
The article in the Louisiana Civil Code that follows Article
98 is both to exhort and to introduce the whole subject matter of
parental authority:
Spouses mutually assume the moral and material direction
of the family, exercise parental authority, and assume the
moral and material obligations resulting there-from.38
Spouses, the article directs, are to assume the direction of the
family, both in terms of moral instruction and direction but also
material, or economic, direction. They, by marrying, assume the
moral and material obligations resulting from the imposition of
responsibility for such direction. In fact, there are material obliga-
tions owed to the family, defined in a limited sense as father,
31. LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 98, cmt. b (West 2003).
32. Id., art. 98, cmt. c.
33. Id.
34. Id., art. 98, cmt. f ("[Sipouses are free to live together as necessary to
fulfill their obligation mutually to support, assist, and be faithful to each
other.").
35. LA. Ci,. CODE ANN. art. 103 (West 2003).
36. IA. CI. CODE ANN. art. 111 (West 2003) (requiring a spouse to be
without fault to be eligible for spousal support).
37. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 103(2) (West 2003) (adultery).
38. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 99 (West 2003).
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mother, and children;3 9 support owed to children and other
descendants, 40 as well as their maintenance and education. The
reference in Article 99 to "parental authority" refers to an entire
title of Book I devoted to the authority of parents over their chil-
dren. Added in 1987, the article's source was the Quebec Civil
Code.4
By surveying and comparing some of the other Civil Codes
throughout the world 41 there are additional provisions which
could easily be adopted to add strength and vitality to the legal
content of marriage. Some of the proposed statutes are obliga-
tory articles to which certain consequences are or could be
attached (shall), and other articles are merely hortatory (should).
The following examples of such articles have been adapted and
the language modified from the original and its translation;
these examples are also not exhaustive of the content of every
European or European-derived Civil Code.
Spousal Obligations:
* Spouses owe each other respect, fidelity, succour, and
assistance.43
" Spouses are bound to live together,4 4 unless there is good
cause otherwise.4 5
39. LA. CiV. CODE art. 3506(12) (West 2003).
40. Id. arts. 227, 229. The latter imposes a limited lifetime obligation upon
ascendants for the support of their descendants and vice versa; the obligation is
relatively unique to Western [historically European] civil law jurisdictions.
41. Id. art. 99, annot. (West 1999). See CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 394 (Que.)
("The spouses together take in hand the moral and material direction of the
family, exercise parental authority, and assume the tasks resulting therefrom.").
42. See, e.g., FAMILY CODE [FAM. CODE] OF THE PHILIPPINES; C6DIGO CVIL
[C.C.] arts. 66-71 (Spain); C. civ. arts. 392-415 (Que.); CODICE CIVILE [C.c.]
arts. 143-48 (Italy); CODE CVIL [C. civ.] arts. 212-26 (Fr.); CODIGO CIVIL [C.C.]
arts. 137-40 (Venez.). Translations of the Italian Civil Code, Spanish Civil
Code, and Venezuelan Civil Code were the work of my research assistance, Mr.
Crosby C. Lyman, to whom I am deeply indebted.
43. C. civ. art. 392 (Que.) ("[T]hey owe each other respect, fidelity, suc-
cour and assistance .... ").
44. Id. See also C.C. art. 137 (Venez.); FAM. CODE art. 68 (Phil.); C.C. art.
68 (Spain); C.c. art. 143 (Italy).
45. Consider the following provision of the FAM. CODE art. 69 (Phil.):
"The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter
should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the
exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with
the solidarity of the family." Id. (emphasis added).
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" The spouses shall determine by mutual consent the family
(or conjugal) residence,46 according to their require-
ments and those of the family.47
" Spouses are obliged to observe mutual love and respect.48
" Spouses mutually oblige themselves to a community of
living.49
" Spouses should reciprocally attend to the satisfaction of
the other's needs.5°
" The management of the household shall be the right and
the duty of both spouses.'
Familial Obligations.2
* Spouses by mutual consent after collaboration 51 shall
make decisions relating to family life.54
* Spouses should act in the interest of the family.
5
" Marriage obligates the spouses to maintain, to teach, and
to educate their children in accordance with their capaci-
46. C.C. art. 70 (Spain): "The spouses will determine by common consent
the conjugal residence and, in case of discrepancy, the judge will resolve the
dispute, keeping in mind the interest of the family." See also FAM. CODE art. 69
(Phil.); C. Cir. art. 215 (Fr.); C.C. art. 140 (Venez.).
47. C.c. art. 144 (Italy).
48. FAM. CODE art. 68 (Phil.).
49. C. Cny. art. 215 (Fr.).
50. C.C. art. 139 (Venez.) ("This obligation ends if a spouse is removed
from the common residence withoutjust cause. If a spouse fails to comply with
the above obligations, without just cause, the other spouse may petition forjudi-
cial enforcement of the obligations.").
51. FAM. CODE art. 71 (Phil.) ("The expenses for such management shall
be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 Uoint responsibility;
paid first from community property].").
52. See also Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Family as Community: Implementation
of the "Children-First" Principle, in MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A COMMUNITARIAN PER-
SPECrnE, 235-56 (Martin King Whyte ed. 2000).
53. C.c. art. 143 (Italy) ("From the marriage derives the reciprocal obliga-
tion to be faithful, to provide moral and material assistance, to collaborate in
the interest of the family, and to cohabitate.").
54. C.C. art. 140 (Venez.).
55. C.C. art. 67 (Spain). The Quebec Civil Code actually creates a "family
patrimony": "Marriage entails the establishment of a family patrimony consist-
ing of certain property of the spouses regardless of which of them holds a right
of ownership in that property." C. civ. art. 414 (Que.). Article 415 lists in detail
what property constitutes a part of the "family patrimony."
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ties, natural inclination, and aspirations, 56 and to prepare
them for their future.57
" Spouses must contribute to the needs of the family in pro-
portion to their actual capacity, be it economic or in ser-
vice within the household. 8
* Spouses shall contribute to the expenses of the marriage,
such as the care and maintenance of the common home,
in proportion to their respective means.59 Each spouse
may incur an obligation that relates to an expense of the
marriage, which includes the support of the household
and education of the children, 60 and this obligation shall
be joint6 1 (and several62 or solidary63 ).
Remedies for General Breach of Obligations:
* When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the
conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring dan-
ger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the
aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.64 (Relief
could consist of an order of support, injunctive relief in
the form of a temporary restraining order, or other appro-
priate legal mechanisms.)
The only potential legal obstacle to the re-regulation of the
content of marriage is Lawrence v. Texas.65
56. C.c. art. 147 (Italy) ("The marriage imposes the obligation on the
spouses to maintain, to teach and to educate the offspring taking into account
the capacity, the natural inclination and the aspirations of the sons."); see also
LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 99, supra note 38 and accompanying text; C. crv. art.
394 (Que.).
57. C. Crv. art. 213 (Fr.).
58. C.c. art. 143 (Italy).
59. C. Cav. art. 213 (Fr.). See also LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2373 (West
1985) (applying to spouses who choose a separation of property regime).
60. C. Crv. art. 220 (Fr.).
61. FAm. CODE art. 70 (Phil.) ("The spouses are jointly responsible for the
support of the family.").
62. C. Clv. art. 220 (Fr.) ("Each one of the spouses has the power to make
alone contracts which relate to the support of the household or the education
of children: any debt thus contracted by the one binds the other jointly."). Nev-
ertheless, joint and several obligations do not arise as regards expenditures that
are manifestly excessive with the reference to the way of living of the house-
hold, to the usefulness or uselessness of the transaction, to the good or bad
faith of the contracting third party. Id. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2372
(West 1985) (source: C. Civ. art. 220 (Fr.)) (applying to spouses who choose a
separation of property regime).
63. See LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 1794 (West 1987) (providing 'solidary' as a
civil law term for joint and several).
64. FAm. CODE art. 72 (Phil.).
65. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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III. THE THREAT TO RE-REGUlATION OF MARRIAGE POSED BY
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
To assess the threat that the Lawrence case poses to a legal re-
regulation of marriage, it is necessary to examine carefully the
emphasis of the author of the opinion, Justice Kennedy, upon
certain distinguishing features of the Texas legislation. The
Texas statute was declared unconstitutional under the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because (1) the Texas
statute was a criminal statute punishing acts of adult, consensual sexual
intimacy in the home. Such acts are, according to the majority,
within the protected "liberty" interest of adults:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places .... Free-
dom extends [however] beyond spatial bounds. Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case
involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcen-
dent dimensions.6 6
The special offensiveness of the criminal nature of the stat-
ute according to Justice Kennedy is that: "[i]f protected conduct
[adult, consensual, sexual intimacy in the home] is made crimi-
nal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its sub-
stantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not
enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons."67 Further-
more,
[w] hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of
the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to
subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the
public and in the private spheres .... Its continuance as
precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.
The stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not
trivial [even though it is a Class C misdemeanor]. 68
Justice Kennedy likewise emphasized that (2) the case did not
involve minors, "persons who might be injured or coerced or who
are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused."69 (3) Nor, did the case "involve public conduct or prostitu-
tion."7" In addition, Justice Kennedy assures us, (4) " [i] t does not
66. Id. at 2475 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 2482.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2484 (emphasis added).
70. Id. (emphasis added).
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involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any rela-
tionship that homosexual persons seek to enter."71
The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship
that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals. This, as a general rule, should
counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define
the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries
absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law
protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain
their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is
more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.72
Forgive me, but I am not reassured.
The implications of the decision in Lawrence for proposed
new statutory regulation of the content of marriage lie in its rec-
ognition and description of the "liberty" interest protected under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Bowers v. Hardwick,73 expressly
overruled in the Lawrence case,7 4 clearly limited "fundamental
rights" recognized within the concept of "liberty" and protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment to those "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." 75 That categorization of the "lib-
erty" interest of an individual to be free from unnecessary gov-
ernmental regulation and intrusion anchored "liberty" to the
history and traditions of our country and established certain
parameters beyond which the Court could not stray to nullify
state law. Contrary to Justice Kennedy's declaration that "there
has been no individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort
that could counsel against overturning its holding,"76 scholars,
legislators, and policymakers have relied upon the definition of
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 2478 (emphasis added).
73. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
74. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 ("Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent.
Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.").
75. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
76. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483.
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"liberty" in the Bowers case since it was decided. I was one of
them, in my capacity as scholar and as legislator.77
Unanchored from and unmoored to our history and tradi-
tions, the "liberty" interest Justice Kennedy finds in the Four-
teenth Amendment "presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate con-
duct. ' 7' That "liberty" interest is both spatial and transcen-
dent. 9 The transcendental dimension of the "liberty" from
governmental intrusion to which the Justice refers includes per-
sonal decisions relating to marriage [entry into marriage], pro-
creation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and
education-decisions "involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to per-
sonal dignity and autonomy... ."8 But, among the most radical
of statements contained in the entire opinion is the following:
"At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life."8" Breathtakingly radical individual autonomy.s2 With
the pulling up of the anchor of the "liberty" interest which sets us
adrift from our history and traditions, Justice Kennedy expressly
rejects as a part of the project of defining "liberty" the considera-
77. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) the majority
opinion relied upon the same definition of "liberty" interest to uphold the con-
stitutionality of a California statute that denied to a biological father the fight
to institute a filiation action against his child born to a married woman whose
husband was thus presumed to be the father of the child. See id. at 127 n.6.
As a drafter of statutes, most recently of a revision of the law of filiation, I
relied upon footnote 6 for the proposition that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not require that
when a child has a legal father (husband of the mother) the biological father
must be allowed to institute a filiation action to establish his paternity and seek
custody or visitation.
78. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
79. Id.
80. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992).
81. Id., quoted in Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2489.
82. See Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2484 ("They [drafters and ratifiers of the
Due Process Clause] knew times can blind us to certain truths and later genera-
tions can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke
its principles in their own search for greater freedom.") (emphasis added).
It is possible to conceive of a decision by a federal court, even the Supreme
Court itself, that finds within the fundamental right to marry, the fundamental
fight to remarry (since it need not be a part of our historical traditions) which
may necessarily include obtaining a divorce (without undue governmental
interference)-divorce "piggybacks" on remarriage to create a fundamental
right to divorce.
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tion of "religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable
behavior, and respect for the traditional family. '83 The Justice
admits that these considerations are not "trivial," but indeed are
"profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral
principles to which [citizens] aspire and which thus determine
the course of their lives." 84 However, we must not "'mandate our
own moral code.' "85 That is what we have always done. Not surpris-
ingly, Justice O'Connor's separate opinion, like so many of her
other opinions which lack logical rigor,8 6 seeks to distinguish
good and acceptable laws that "preserve the traditions of society"
from those bad and unacceptable laws that "express moral disap-
proval."8 7 A distinction without a difference.
With radical individual autonomy now at the heart of the
"liberty" interest of the Due Process Clause, there appear to be no
parameters within which that "liberty" dwells. Furthermore,
there appears to be no consideration in the identifying and pro-
tecting of this evolving "liberty," of the impact such decisions by
one individual may have on others-not even on an existing
spouse or children. Nor is there any apparent hesitation in creat-
ing a broad right of autonomy that attaches to one individual
which will inevitably come into conflict with the same right of
other individuals. How are those conflicts to be resolved? Whose
right to autonomy "trumps?" At the heart of the re-regulation of
marriage by the law is governmental regulation (interference)
within the home (geographical dimension of "liberty") of adult,
consensual, intimate, and in some cases, sexual behavior (tran-
scendent dimension). The legal obligation of a spouse not to
share her sexual potential with another and to submit to the rea-
sonable sexual desires of her husband is not punishable crimi-
nally nor does it involve public criminal behavior. However, the
obligation does involve mandating our shared moral code, princi-
pally the result of deep religious convictions. And, although it is
83. Id. at 2480.
84. Id. Comparing the language ofJustice Stevens in his dissenting opin-
ion in Bowers, the words are almost identical. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that neither the history nor
tradition of immoral conduct held by a majority of state citizens is relevant to a
decision about the fundamental nature of a right recognized under the Four-
teenth Amendment).
85. Laurence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
86. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding a Washing-
ton state statute affording broad visitation fights to non-parents unconstitu-
tional as "applied" to the grandparents asserting such a right). For two years
scholars and legislators have tried to determine what the Troxel decision means
for other state visitation statutes with little success.
87. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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not a criminal statute, it may have serious consequences for the
spouse who makes the wrong choice-divorce and/or denial of
spousal support. Without objective limitations in the nature of
the common good on "liberty" as radical individual autonomy,
any distinction drawn between a criminal statute and a civil statute
seems weak and arbitrary, and in the end unpersuasive.
At the end of the twentieth century after suffering through
the sexual revolution, the therapeutic revolution, the feminist
revolution, and the divorce revolution," a nascent counter-
revolution aimed at restoring traditional marriage has begun,
both at the elite opinion level and at the grassroots level. Sci-
ence, both physical and social, is revealing that long-held tradi-
tions, customs, and moral beliefs, many of which are derived
from religion, are demonstrably correct. Thus, a question to
ponder is whether Justice Scalia, who observed that later genera-
tions can change their minds, is right: "[I] t is the premise of our
system that those judgments are to be made by the people, and
not imposed by a governing caste that knows best." 9 A gov-
erning caste of five, unelected, unaccountable judges? Can they
arrest the counter-revolution to rescue and reinvigorate marriage
and the traditional family? Can they arrest this counter-revolu-
tion launched solely for the protection of children?
IV. ACTION PLAN
If the revitalization of marriage and its content through
legal regulation is threatened by the United States Supreme
Court, we should know it sooner rather than later. The only way
to know if the threat is real, not imagined, is to enact legislation
and await constitutional litigation. It would be a service to the
people of this country to expose the threat of a "governing caste"
of five Supreme Court justices, if indeed Lawrence foreshadows
such power. Should the eventuality be that the "liberty" interest
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pre-
vents legal regulation of the content of marriage, there is
another solution suggested by constitutional jurisprudence.
A "liberty" interest incorporated within the Due Process
Clause may be waived as long as the waiver is voluntary and know-
ing." For states with a covenant marriage law,91 such as Louisi-
88. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The Future
of Marriage in the Law, 49 Loy. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (2003).
89. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (2003) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
90. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (discussing voluntary
and knowing waiver of Fourth Amendment rights in the context of criminal
law); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (discussing First Amendment rights
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ana,9 2 Arkansas,9" and Arizona,94 legal regulation of the content
of marriage would be consistent with the covenant spouses'
choice of a more highly regulated form of marriage, a form dis-
tinguished by the obligation to take reasonable steps to preserve
their marriage if difficulties arise and by the more restrictive
grounds for divorce. To add legal content to the marital rela-
tionship during its existence would be unobjectionable to the
couples who choose covenant marriage; they are qualitatively dif-
ferent in a myriad of ways from the general population of "stan-
dard" couples.95 Even more importantly, pre-marital counseling
is mandatory and it is during the pre-marital counseling that the
couple receives information about the content of a covenant
marriage. That information comes from the government in the
form of a pamphlet prepared by the Attorney General.96 The
covenant couple must execute an affidavit (in the presence of a
notary) attesting to having received pre-marital counseling
(accompanied by an attestation by the counselor) and to having
read the Attorney General's pamphlet.97 Additional information in
the pamphlet about newly enacted laws regulating a spouse's
behavior toward the other during marriage and their joint
responsibility to the members of the new family being formed
would be a simple matter. The affidavit executed by both
spouses attesting to having read the pamphlet98 should suffice as
a voluntary and knowing waiver of their "right to be free from
governmental regulation of their adult, consensual, intimate
relationship" and, furthermore, constitute adequate proof of the
waiver.
in government employment context); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (discussing waiver of Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches); Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (discussing waiver of Sixth
Amendment rights to legal counsel).
91. Covenant marriage legislation permits couples who wish to marry a
choice of a more binding and restrictive form of marriage than the current "no-
fault" divorce legislation. The three distinct features of a covenant marriage
statute are mandatory pre-marital counseling, a legally binding agreement obli-
gating the spouses to take reasonable steps to preserve their marriage if difficul-
ties arise, and restricted grounds for divorce.
92. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § § 272-275.1 (2000).
93. ARK. CODE ANN. § § 9-11-801 to -811 (2001).
94. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § § 25-901 to -906 (2000).
95. STEVEN N. NOCK ET AL., INTIMATE EQurrY: THE EARLY YEARS OF COVE-
NANT AND STANDARD MARRIAGES 6 (2003), available at http://www.bgsu.edu/or
ganizations/cfdr/research/pdf/2003/2003_.04.pdf (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
96. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:237 (2000).
97. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(1) (2000).
98. Id.
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CONCLUSION
There is a hunger among a growing number of Americans,
young and old, even the cynical, to recapture the mystery and
stability of the institution of marriage. One of many possibilities
using the law as the collective voice of the citizenry is to re-regu-
late the content of marriage. A legal system that permits the two
spouses to regulate their own relationship without direction con-
cerning their behavior toward each other or their children sug-
gests a lack of interest and concern for marriage by the broader
community. Nothing could be further from the truth, yet by the
withdrawal of law from the regulation of marriage, couples
believe that their marriage is a creation of their own, intended for
their individual happiness. By withdrawing from the regulation
of marriage, society has abandoned their interest in the relation-
ship to the significant detriment of children. Surely no one
could have predicted that parents would themselves by the end
of the twentieth century assume that their individual interests
and desires mattered more than their duty to their own children.
Nonetheless, they do. It is time to reassert the public's interest in
marriage by subjecting its content to legal regulation, an expres-
sion of society's expectations for every marriage. To the extent
that Lawrence v. Texas poses a constitutional threat to such re-reg-
ulation, that threat should be exposed and the raw and undis-
guised usurpation of power by the Supreme Court confronted.
Even if Lawrence prohibits the statutory re-regulation of mar-
riage, there is a viable alternative for such re-regulation-cove-
nant marriage legislation. I have on numerous occasions99
argued that covenant marriage legislation offers to those people
of the dissident culture, either those who belong to a religious
community or those who adhere to traditional morality, a safe
haven from the post-modern, dominant culture. Lawrence v.
Texas adds new urgency to the construction of "safe havens" for
all who desire protection from a corrosive culture advanced by
an elite, "governing caste." Within a "safe haven," spouses who
desire to restore the institution of marriage may offer themselves
collectively as witnesses to others about sacrificial love and its
central role in binding male and female to each other and their
offspring. Marriage itself for such couples is a transcendent real-
99. See, e.g., Katherine Shaw Spaht, Why Covenant Marriage May Prove Effec-
tive as a Response to the Culture of Divorce, in REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF
MARRIAGE FOR THE TWENTY-FiRsr CENTUR: AN AGENDA FOR STRENGTHENING
MARRIAGE 59-69 (Alan J. Hawkins et al. eds., 2002); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Mar-
riage: Why a Second Tier Called Covenant Marriage?, 12 REGENT U.L. REv. 1
(1999-2000).
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ity,r ° a virtual legal personality deserving of the ultimate defer-
ence. The opposite of radical individual autonomy. And it is a
choice, an exercise of free will.
100. See NOCK ET AL., supra note 95.
